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4 November 1963

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CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN



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State Department review completed

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*Greece: The narrow upset victory of the Center Union (CU) party in the 3 November national elections and former Premier Karamanlis' announced retirement foreshadow a period of increased political instability.

A coalition government will probably result, with CU and National Radical Union (ERE) participation. George Papandreou, 72-year-old leader of the CU will probably emerge as premier, with the leader of the ERE faction Karamanlis' former deputy, Panayotis Kanellopolis, or some other leading ERE figure. Prospects for long-term success of this coalition are not bright, and new elections will probably be held before long.

Other parties showed little strength, with the Communist-dominated EDA getting less than 15 percent of the popular vote, about the same as its 1961 figure.

As far as Papandreou can establish national policy, it will tend to be somewhat more "independent" vis-avis the West than was the case under Karamanlis. The election results also increase the possibility of Greek-Turkish friction over Cyprus, where Archbishop Makarios may now be encouraged to take a more intransigent position in the expectation of stronger support from the new government than he got under Karamanlis.

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USSR - Communist China: On 1 November the Soviet ambassador to India, a Central Committee member, told US Embassy officials that a new world Communist conference is wholly unlikely in the foreseeable future.

He added that, while the bilateral talks between Moscow and Peiping had not been terminated but only recessed, he did not see any chance for their early resumption.

The apparent Soviet decision to put off any immediate call for a conference probably stems in large measure from the persuasive arguments of foreign Communist leaders, who have conferred with Soviet leaders in recent weeks, that the disruptive effects of a formal condemnation of the Chinese would outweigh any advantages Moscow could derive from a conference.

Moscow's change of attitude has been reflected in recent Soviet press treatment of foreign Communist party statements. On 28 October Pravda reported an Italian Communist party statement which contained the first explicit admission of major foreign Communist opposition to a conference. And on 2 November Pravda published a joint French-Dutch Communist party statement which strongly implied that while a conference is desirable, now is not the time.

Any Soviet decision to forego or at least postpone a conference, however, would not preclude some demonstration of solidarity by pro-Soviet parties during the forthcoming Bolshevik Revolution anniversary.

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DAILY BRIEF

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NOTES 25X1 25X1 Panama: (A demonstration or minor incident could set off trouble during today's flag day parade. Sensational news stories of an impending general strike have increased the general air of uneasiness and may discourage responsible participation in the parade, giving extremist elements an opportunity to dominate the scene.

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DAILY BRIEF

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Special Counsel to the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The Department of State

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The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

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Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

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Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

Commander in Chief, Atlantic

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The Director, The Joint Staff

The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

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